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In "Realism and Respect," Professor Baldner 
attempts to defend holistic environmental ethics 
against criticisms I made of it in my book, 
Morals, Reason, and Animals (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1987). While I very 
much appreciate the care Professor Baldner has 
given to accurately stating and thoughtfully 
critiquing my views, I do not find that critique 
compelling for the following reasons. 
First, the fundamental, theoretical flaw in 
environmental ethics of the sort Baldner advocates 
is the belief that values can exist without 
reference to the capacities of sentient beings. The 
prevalence of this mistaken belief among 
environmental ethicists may be due to the use of 
"value" in phrases like "its value for evolution." In 
such phrases "value" refers to the role played by 
something in evolution. This role can be 
completely explicated m non-evaluative 
descriptions of how this thing interacted with 
other things to contribute to the course of 
evolution. That this can be done shows that the 
term is being used non-evaluatively in such 
phrases. Where evaluation enters here is in the 
presumption that the course or products of 
evolution are good, fulfilling a purpose, or 
otherwise worthy. That is a value something has 
not merely "for evolution" but for a sentient being 
contemplating evolution. 
Baldner attempts to support his value theory by 
contending that "if the existence of the natural 
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environment is not dependent upon us, neither is 
its value." However, this contention is false. 
Values are supervenient properties; it follows that 
things can exist without value and that the source 
of their existence can differ from the source of 
their value. Once again, Baldner's mistake here 
may be due to confusing playing a role with 
having value: he holds the natural environment to 
comprise a system; consequently, anything that 
comes to exist in that environment will be playing 
a role in a system. Once again, playing a role is 
not the same as having value; on a world where 
sentient life arises, which no sentient being visits, 
and which otherwise has no effect on sentient life, 
the wind may play a role in the geological 
evolution of the topography, but there is no value 
to it. There is merely the replacement of one 
configuration by another. 
Second, Baldner sees focusing on sentience in 
value theory as unjustifiably holding that sentient 
beings are especially "important" by virtue of 
being "similar to human beings" (lingering 
anthropocentrism). This is doubly wrong. 
Sentient beings are not at the center of a 
consistent and adequate value theory because they 
are more important than nonsentient beings or 
environments; they are at the center because it is 
through their relations to sentient beings that 
things come to have value. Furthermore, there is 
nothing anthropocentric here; being sentient is not 
a relational property. Describing a being as 
sentient is no more comparing it to humans than 
is saying it has a mouth. A moral philosopher 
does not have to be misanthropic in order not to 
be anthropocentric. 
Third, like other environmental ethicists, Baldner 
seems to envisage only two ways in which nature 
may be morally evaluated: either nature is merely 
a resource to be cut down, dug up, and otherwise 
transformed and consumed to fulfill human 
desires, or nature has overriding value of its own, 
is an end-in-itself which must be preserved as is. 
This is a false dilemma; we can recognize that the 
value of nature is not limited to being a resource 
for human consumption without regarding it as an 
end-in-itself. First, we can acknowledge that 
nature is of value for sentient but nonhuman 
beings. Second, we can recognize that many 
humans value nature remaining as it is; they value 
contemplating or communing with nature, not just 
consummg it. Finally, we can recognize that 
preserving natural systems is important for 
preserving our own existence; the uninhibited 
consumption of natural resources may leave us 
unable to sustain ourselves. Thus, one can share 
the environmentalists' love of nature and dismay 
at its continuing destruction at the hands of 
human profiteers and can develop moral 
philosophies which accommodate those feelings 
without having to regard the natural environment 
as an end-in-itself. 
Finally, Baldner contends that is "arrogant" and 
"paternalistic" morally to condemn something as 
definitive of the natural order as predation. 
However, it is in the nature of morality to devise 
ideals of a better world and to work toward 
realizing them. This entails judging this world to 
be less than ideal and working to change it. One 
could restrict moral evaluations to the products of 
human activity, but that would be arbitrary: what 
makes suffering (prima facie) morally bad is not 
that it is the result of human activity but that it 
is suffering. Our commitment to making the 
world a morally better place impels us to make 
moral evaluations of the natural order. There 
need be nothing either arrogant or paternalistic in 
making and acting on such evaluations, provided 
we recognize the very limited nature of our 
understanding and our power to make 
improvements. 
Of course, we could give up the moral 
enterprise altogether and maintain that whatever 
is is right. But even environmental ethicists seem 
unwilling to do this, since they are intent on 
condemning attitudes which have been definitive 
of Western culture and on substantially 
transforming that culture. Is this arrogant and 
paternalistic on their part? 
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